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An Ethical Examination of  Libertarian Paternalism: The Impact of  
Retirement Savings Nudges on Autonomy and Welfare 
“It is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily believe if  one thinks too long alone, particularly in 
economics” - John Maynard Keynes  
Abstract 
Behavioral economists have recommended the use of  nudges to promote welfare through public 
and private policies as a form of  ‘libertarian paternalism’. It remains a controversial topic and 
opponents of  nudging claim that it violates individual liberty and autonomy. Even so, nudging 
has found success in helping people save more for retirement. Automatic enrollment and the Save 
More Tomorrow™ plan use defaults to encourage higher participation and contribution rates in 
401(k) retirement savings plans. I argue that these policies violate individual autonomy and fail to 
determine individuals’ preferences. Ethical interventions prioritize the intelligibility of  
preferences, enhance individual autonomy, and promote welfare over time.  
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Introduction 
	 Decisions are not made in a vacuum. Richard Thaler argues that, “the first 
misconception is that it is possible to avoid influencing people’s choices” (Sunstein & Thaler 
2009, 12). If  this is true, then a tremendous weight is placed on the shoulders of  the ‘choice 
architects’ who influence  — intentionally or unintentionally— how people make decisions. The 
design of  the environment in which people make decisions has an strong effect on underlying 
cognitive processes that influence how decisions are made. That being so, it may not be the case 
that humans are always in control of  their decisions. Most economic models of  choice depict the 
homo economicus, or the economic man, who is able to “think and choose unfailingly well,” and 
“store as much memory as IBM’s Big Blue” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 7). Unfortunately, humans 
in the real world rarely exhibit these traits. 
	 Since the rise of  behavioral economics, the standard model of  rationality has been 
criticized for its inability to explain anomalies in human decision making. Insights from 
psychology have identified a number of  cognitive biases and heuristics that help explain these 
anomalies. Heuristics and biases are mental shortcuts, or “rules of  thumb,” (Sunstein & Thaler 
2009, 28) that we use to make decisions. They appear systematically and predictably, acting as 
cognitive errors that negatively affect judgement and decision making. In light of  these 
discoveries, behavioral economists have found a way to apply the insights of  their field: nudging.  
	 Nudging is a method of  modifying the environment in which decisions are made in order 
to “alter people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 8). By relying on an 
understanding of  cognitive biases and heuristics, nudges could help steer people to make better 
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decisions in situations where they are most likely to err. That being so, nudging could promote 
welfare through public and private policies as a form of  libertarian paternalism. However, it 
remains a controversial topic and opponents of  nudging maintain that it is “insidious and deeply 
manipulative” (Rebonato 2015, 12), exploiting cognitive weaknesses and taking away our 
freedom to choose.  
	 With consideration of  these ideas, this paper explores the ethics of  libertarian paternalism 
and the economic implications of  nudge policies in the context of  retirement savings. Arguably, 
people around the world are not saving enough for retirement. To add, there are many people 
who express in interest in wanting to save more for retirement, but do not. This inconsistent 
behavior has been attributed to cognitive biases and decisional inertia. As such, this paper 
considers the ethical implications of  libertarian paternalistic interventions aimed at helping 
people overcome these factors and save more for retirement. Over the course of  this 
investigation, I discuss the ethical implications of  libertarian paternalism and its applications in 
retirement savings.  In this effort, I provide a balanced review of  the criticisms and defenses of  
libertarian paternalism. Having considered these arguments, I then look at the ethical 
implications of  automatic enrollment and the Save More Tomorrow plan — two popular 
libertarian paternalistic retirement savings interventions. With consideration of  these policies, I 
then offer a conclusive recommendation of  how individuals could be ethically helped to save 
more for retirement. In my view, I argue that ethical retirement savings interventions have the 
capacity to enhance individual autonomy and promote welfare over time.  
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Chapter 1  
What is a Nudge? 
	 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, the two main advocates of  libertarian paternalism, 
define a nudge as  
“any aspect of  the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To 
count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not 
mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does 
not” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 12) 
	 To put the definition of  a nudge in context, let us consider an example. In Chicago, there 
is a scenic road called Lake Shore Drive that overlooks the city’s iconic skyline. A section of  this 
road puts drivers through a series of  S curves that has become infamously dangerous because of  
countless car accidents. The city of  Chicago has addressed the issue by painting the road with 
white lines (that do not provide tactile information, only visual). When the stripes first appear, 
they are evenly spaced, but as the driver reaches the most dangerous portion of  the curve, the 
stripes get closer together, creating the sensation that driving speed is increasing (see figure 1). 
Predictably, this causes most drivers to slow down, so we could call it a nudge. Surely, the driver 
could choose to drive quickly around the corner if  they want to, but they are often nudged to go 
slower. This is a nudge that saves lives.  
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	 While the Lake Shore Drive example is not taking advantage of  cognitive shortcomings, 
per se, it is example of  how people can easily be nudged, especially in situations that are 
unfamiliar to them. Furthermore, it holds value as an example of  how humans could be nudged 
in their own benefit. It seems fair to say that most people do not want to die in a car accident. 
While the Lake Shore Drive example demonstrates how a nudge functions generally, this paper 
investigates nudges that aim to correct irrationalities in economic decision making, particularly in 
retirement savings. 
How do nudges work? 
	 Consider the following image of  two tables: 
 	 At first glance, the table on the left will seem longer to most people. However, if  a 
measurement is taken, it becomes evident that both tables are identical in their dimensions. 
Normally the human mind works remarkably well, but in some situations it can deceive us. This 
is a key insight that psychology has brought to behavioral economics. Thaler writes that even 
 
(Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 190)
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“Einstein would probably have been fooled by those tables” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 21).  From 
examples like this table illusion, we learn about the fallibility of  the human mind — a mind that 
adopts sensible rules of  thumb that sometimes “lead [people] astray” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 
40). This does not mean that there is something wrong with humans, but it does mean that our 
understanding of  the human mind can be improved by understanding how we consistently make 
the same errors in our decision making. Nudging could help us avoid making irrational decisions 
and judgements.  
	 There are certain peculiarities of  the human mind that allow nudges to work. Daniel 
Kahneman in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow argues that humans have a “System-I,” which is 
fast, intuitive, and emotional, and a “System-II,” which is slow, deliberate, and logical 
(Kahneman 2015, 13). Cass Sunstein describes our system 1 to be “a bit like Homer Simpson,” 
while our System-II is “more like Spok from Star Trek” (Sunstein 2015, 26). The majority of  the 
cognitive heuristics occur systemically in system-I. Depending on the situation, we are more or 
less likely to be at risk of  making a cognitive error, but we are particularly vulnerable in unusual 
or unfamiliar situations (Sunstein 2015). Nudging, therefore, is most useful in these types of  
situations because that is when people are most likely to rely on our system-I to make a decision, 
and hence the most likely to be affected by a cognitive bias. 
	 As an example, of  a cognitive bias let us consider loss aversion. Loss aversion is a 
cognitive bias that says we dislike losses more than we like corresponding gains. Consider a 
simple experiment:  half  of  the students in a class were given mugs with their university insignia 
and asked how much money they would be willing to sell them for. The other half, who were not 
given mugs, were asked for what price they would be willing to buy a mug. Predictably, the 
students who were given mugs demanded roughly twice as much to sell their mugs as the others 
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were willing to pay to acquire one (Tversky & Kahneman 1991). These results also demonstrate 
that framing a problem in terms of  gains and losses has a strong effect on how people make 
decisions. As an example of  the framing effect, Tatiana A. Homonoff  explored the impact of  
framing on the use of  plastic bags. She found that if  people must pay a five-cent tax for using a 
plastic bag, they are more likely to be affected than if  they are given a five-cent bonus for 
bringing their own bag (Homonoff  2018). In this case, losses are valued more than gains. This is 
loss aversion at work. 
	 Interestingly, framing effects seem to disappear if  these types of  problems are dealt with 
in a different language. When people are asked to consider questions like those of  the mug 
experiment in a foreign language  that they speak proficiently (but not necessarily comfortably), 
they are less likely to show framing effects or loss aversion (Keysar et. al. 2012). When people are 
speaking their native language, they think quickly and effortlessly using system-I, but when people 
are speaking another language they are less comfortable with, their system-I becomes 
overwhelmed and system-II is activated. The authors of  the relevant study call it the ‘foreign 
language effect.’ A reduction in emotional resonance is associated with speaking a foreign 
language, and emotional reactions are often responsible for inducing poor decisions. Indeed, the 
human mind may be fallible, but this experiment reveals a silver lining: when humans think 
slowly, system-II takes over and we become less likely to make cognitive errors.  
	 With consideration of  these examples, the fallibility of  the human becomes recognizable.  
This is problematic from an ethical point of  view because it directly challenges the notion of  
what it means to be an autonomous decision maker. In many situations, people may not be as in 
control of  their own decisions as they think they are. Politicians and policymakers are more than 
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aware of  this fallibility, and have turned to libertarian paternalistic nudge interventions that 
purportedly influence people’s behavior to promote their welfare. 
	 One area where nudging has been arguably most successful is in retirement savings plans. 
Some would argue that retirement savings rates in the U.S. are too low. Notably, these low savings 
rates can be attributed cognitive biases that prevent people from joining retirement savings plans. 
In order to address this problem, behavioral economists have recommended the use of  nudge 
policies to encourage participation in retirement savings plans and to increase contribution rates. 
Nudging in Retirement Savings  
	 The entire U.S. retirement system stands on a three-legged stool. Americans must rely on 
Social Security, pensions, and personal savings to provision for the future. In When I’m Sixty-Four 
by Ghilarducci she argues that a comfortable retirement plan requires a replacement of  65% to 
80% of  pre-retirement income (Ghilarducci 2018, 26). Relying on anyone of  these sources alone 
would not be sufficient to meet this goal. Also, there has been a national shift from defined benefit 
pension plans to defined contribution pension plans. Among full-time employees in medium and 
large private establishments, the percentage of  those covered by a defined benefit plan has fallen 
from 80% in 1985 to merely 33% in 2003 (Ghilarducci 2018, 26). As a result of  this shift, the 
responsibility to save for retirement mostly rests on the employee’s shoulders. 
	 Despite it being one of  the primary vehicles for individuals to save for the future, defined 
contribution pension plans are seeing enrollment rates that “are far from 100 percent” (Benartzi 
& Thaler 2007, 82). There is even a common plan where employers match 50 percent of  
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employee’s contributions up to some threshold. In this case, it would only be rational for 
employees to participate in such a plan with a “sure profit opportunity” (Benartzi & Thaler 2007, 
82), but we still observe that some people do not join, As an extreme example of  employees’ 
apparent reluctance to join a retirement plan, data on 25 defined benefit plans in the United 
Kingdom report that only “half  of  the eligible employees signed up” (Benartzi and Thaler 2007, 
82). This example in particular begs the question: what is preventing people from signing up? 
	 It has become apparent that people do not save like standard economic theories of  
savings predict. The life-cycle model and permanent income model have a hard time explaining 
such low enrollment and savings rates. Even so, that is not to say that people don’t want to be 
saving more. In a relevant study, Choi et. al found that two-thirds of  sample participants in 401(k) 
plans viewed their savings rate as too low. Among these people, 35 percent expressed an interest 
in increasing savings rates in the next few months, but 86 percent of  them never ended up doing 
so (Choi et al. 2004). From this finding it could be argued that there are people who have 
expressed a preference to be saving more, but are not. 	 	 	  
	 One reason why people are not acting on their expressed preferences is that they 
procrastinate. Behavioral economists argue that people discount hyperbolically, which leads to 
procrastination. Hyperbolic discounting says that, as time passes, people become more patient. 
The perceived costs of  waiting are exceeded by the perceived benefits of  a larger reward in the 
future. When considering a decision today, on the other hand, people show time-inconsistent 
behavior and “[weigh] current and near-term consumption especially heavily” (Benartzi & 
Thaler 2004, 81). This behavior leads to impulsivity and procrastination — two factors that 
behavioral economists argue prevent people from saving more for retirement. Coupled with a 
bias for the status quo these two factors thought to generate enough inertia to prevent people 
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from saving the money they want to save (Madrian & Shea 2000). With consideration of  these 
factors, behavioral economists have designed a few nudge policies aimed at increasing retirement 
plan enrollment rates and savings rates. 
Automatic Enrollment 
	 Since low enrollment is thought to be the result of  inertia, economists have recommended 
the use of  a nudge that leverages it. This method, known as automatic enrollment, changes the 
default to automatically enroll employees into a retirement savings plan. Instead of  having 
employees opt-in to a retirement plan, they would be automatically enrolled unless they actively 
choose to opt-out. This is a nudge because it supposedly leverages the employees’ inertia for their 
own good. This strategy has shown to substantially increase enrollment in U.S. defined 
contribution plans. At one firm where automatic enrollment was adopted, participation rates 
jumped to 90 percent immediately and increased to 98 percent after 36 months (Madrian & Shea 
2000). These findings indicate that, under automatic enrollment, employees start saving sooner 
and more participants eventually join. Automatic enrollment, therefore, is thought to help people 
overcome procrastination and a lack of  willpower, helping them realize their expressed 
preference to save. 
	 Additionally, since automatic enrollment automatically enrolls people into a plan, the plan 
must have a default savings rate and asset allocation plan. The defaults are supposed to be 
conservative, so that employees start saving at a low rate with low risk. This gives employees the 
freedom to increase their savings rate, if  they choose, or reallocate how their assets are invested. 
In Madrian & Shea’s study, they also recommend, under automatic enrollment, the large portion 
of  contributions should be directed into the money market fund “where there is much less 
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variation in returns than is the case for stock funds” (Madrian & Shea 2000, 38). Still, though, the 
asset allocation is conservative. Automatic enrollment, in this way, is similar to organ donation 
nudges that set defaults and actively require participants to opt-out (Dalen & Henkens 2014). 
This approach is useful for bringing new participants into retirement plans, effectively providing 
positive fund balances to those who previously had zero fund balances in their 401(k) plans.  
Save More Tomorrow™ 
	 Next, Thaler and Sunstein argue that, even though automatic enrollment is effective at 
increasing participation rates, people “tend to stick to the default contribution rate” (Sunstein & 
Thaler 2009, 122), which are typically quite low. In order to address this problem, Thaler and 
Benartzi created a program called the Save More Tomorrow (SMT) program that nudges 
employees into saving more than they might save if  they were just automatically enrolled. The 
main feature of  the Save More Tomorrow plan is that employees commit in advance to timed 
contribution increases that coincide with pay raises.  Because of  hyperbolic discounting, the lag 
between when employees commit and the first timed contribution increase should be “as long as 
feasible” (Benartzi & Thaler 2004). Second, by synchronizing pay raises with savings increases, 
participants will  “never see their take home amounts go down” (Sunstein and Thaler,  2008). 
This helps employees not view increases in their savings contributions as losses to their income. 
Since people are loss-averse, the SMT program prevents people from seeing a decrease of  their 
income in nominal dollars. Third, the contribution rate increases steadily until it reaches a preset 
maximum, allowing inertia and the status quo bias “[keep] people in the plan” (Benartzi and 
Thaler 2004, 170). Lastly, libertarian paternalists argue that this plan, when combined with 
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automatic enrollment, increases enrollment rates and savings rates. For that reason, SMT is often 
coupled automatic enrollment.  
.  
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Chapter 2  
Ethical Frameworks  
	 So far, we have seen two well-known examples of  libertarian paternalism: automatic 
enrollment and SMT. As it is my primary intention to engage with the ethical implications of  
libertarian paternalism, it is first important to understand the ethical frameworks from which it 
emerged. Keeping automatic enrollment and SMT in mind, I first outline the important features 
of  libertarianism and paternalism, after which I explore how they have come together as a 
reconciliation of  these philosophies. 
Libertarianism  
	 Libertarianism is the view that “[ascribes] an intrinsic value to the individual’s ability to 
express and enact her choices without hindrance” (Rebonato 2015, 19).  This means that 
libertarianism is not consequentialist by nature. In other words, advocating freedom of  economic 
choice because productivity will be enhanced is not libertarianism. Keeping this in mind, I would 
argue that the most salient feature of  libertarianism says that an individual’s freedom to choose 
should be preserved, and it should not be preserved with an instrumental justification. As as 
extension of  this idea, a policy would not be libertarian in nature if  it impedes an individual’s 
right to choose. Any policy that exercises power over another individual is unjust if  it acts against 
their will. As such, most forms of  government intervention are anti-libertarian because there is 
the implicit assumption in libertarianism that says that people are capable of  making decisions 
for themselves.  
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Autonomy in Libertarianism 
	 At the heart of  libertarianism is the notion of  autonomy. Individual autonomy is the idea 
that people can choose for themselves and, more importantly, that individuals are self-governing 
agents. An autonomous agent would make decisions directed by considerations, desires, 
conditions, and characteristics that are a part of  one’s “authentic self ” (Christman 2007). 
Furthermore, I would argue that autonomy should be distinguished from freedom, which 
generally emphasizes the importance of  the ability to act without external or internal constraints. 
Autonomy, therefore, differs from freedom in that it concerns the independence and authenticity 
of  the desires that make someone do something in the first place. If  autonomy is not merely the 
absence of  internal and external constraints, it may not be the case that autonomy is solely the 
freedom to choose. As mentioned, an autonomous decision reflects the will of  the agent’s 
authentic self. Authenticity, however, is hard to measure or recognize. Therefore, the notion of  
authenticity imposes a fragility on individual autonomy that I would like to pay close attention to. 
That being so, it becomes difficult to determine what an authentic decision truly is. In order to 
substantiate this view of  autonomy, I also turn that of  Dworkin, which says that autonomy is not 
only the nominal freedom to choose but “the capacity of  a person to critically reflect upon, and 
then attempt to accept or change, his or her preferences, desires, values, and ideals” (Dworkin 
1988, 48). 
Paternalism 
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	 Generally, paternalism is the “interference of  a state or an individual with another 
person, against their will, defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be 
better off  or protected from harm” (Dworkin 2017). While there are many forms of  paternalism, 
the unifying idea is that there is a reduction of  an individual or group’s freedom for a benefit of  
greater proportion. The loss of  freedom is the cost for making an individual or society better off  
in some way. In On Liberty by John Stuart Mill, he writes that the government should not exercise 
power over people unless it aims to prevent harm to others. To add, he insisted that, as a rule, the 
government may not exercise power over an individual if  its only goal is to protect an individual 
from themselves. Mill argues that, 
	 “the only purpose for which power may be rightfully exercised over any member of  a 		
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or mental, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in 
the opinion of  others, to do so would be wise, or even right. The only part of  the conduct of  
anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of  right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Mill 1869, 8). 
	 Still, there are numerous examples of  laws and regulations that call Mill’s Harm Principle 
into question. For example, there are laws that require people “to get a prescription before 
obtaining certain medicines,” while others “forbid employees from working in unsafe 
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workspaces,” (Sunstein 2015, 4) even if  they would voluntarily take the risk. In some cases, power 
is not only exercised over people to prevent harm done to others, but over  individuals “to 
promote their own good” (Sunstein 2015, 4). As such, there many interventions that are designed 
to protect people from themselves. In certain contexts, people are particularly vulnerable to error, 
giving paternalistic interventions a “strong and emphatically moral argument” (Sunstein 2014, 5) 
to improve an individual’s well-being. Even so, paternalistic policies will always come at a cost: a 
loss of  freedom. That being so, policy makers like Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein believe they 
have discovered the ‘real third way’ —  a way that preserves individual autonomy while 
simultaneously exercising a soft form of  paternalism.  
	 Since libertarian paternalism is thought to be a form of  soft paternalism, then  
understanding the difference between soft and hard paternalism becomes important. Soft 
paternalism is the view that interventions are justified only under conditions when it is necessary 
to determine whether an individual or group is acting voluntarily and knowledgeably. To use 
Mill’s famous damaged bridge example, consider the following quote:  
	 If  either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which 	 	
had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of  his danger, they 
might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of  his liberty; for liberty 
consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. (Mill 1869, 88) 
	 This example illustrates the notion of  soft paternalism quite well. In this situation, the 
person attempting to cross the bridge faces sure danger. Secondly, since there is not enough time 
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to warn him, forcibly stopping him would not only prevent them from being harmed, but it 
would be an opportunity to determine whether or not he is acting voluntarily and knowledgeably. 
If  it is determined that the person is aware of  the bridge’s unsafe condition yet still wants to cross, 
then a soft paternalist must allow him to continue. On the other hand, a hard paternalist would 
say that even if  the person is aware of  the risks and wants to, say, commit suicide, then it may be 
permissible to prevent him from crossing the bridge. In this case, a hard paternalist would be 
entitled to prevent voluntary suicide. With consideration of  these differences, it is interesting that 
nudging is often promoted as a form of  ‘soft’ paternalism because, as I will argue later in this 
paper, some nudges may not be so soft, after all.   
Libertarian Paternalism	  
	 Richard Thaler and Sunstein write that libertarian paternalism is “an approach that 
preserves freedom of  choice but authorizes both private and public institutions to steer people in 
directions that will promote their welfare” (Sunstein and Thaler 2009, 5). They continue by 
writing that they strive to design policies that “maintain or increase freedom of  choice” (Sunstein 
and Thaler 2009, 5). In their understanding, they argue that libertarian paternalistic policies try 
to influence choices in a way that will “make choosers better off, as judged by 
themselves” (Sunstein and Thaler 2009, 5). In many situations, Sunstein and Thaler argue that 
individuals make poor decisions — decisions that they would not have made if  they were 
properly informed. To add, Thaler and Sunstein insist that it is a light, nonintrusive form of  
paternalism because choices are never “blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened” (Sunstein 
and Thaler 2009, 6).   
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	 Keeping this in mind, the goal of  libertarian paternalism is supposedly to promote 
welfare. So, in order to promote welfare, libertarian paternalists rely on ‘choice architecture’ to 
supposedly influence people in their own benefit. In their view, choice architects have the 
“responsibility of  organizing the context in which people make decisions” (Sunstein and Thaler 
2009, 3) in hopes of  steering them in a particular direction. Choice architecture generally 
manifests in two different forms. The first form of  choice architecture describes that which is 
created intentionally, i.e. with the intention serving a particular purpose. While these intentional 
forms of  choice architecture are not all created with the intention of  nudging, per se, they are still 
features of  the context in which people make decisions, and thus have an effect on how people 
make decisions. A door handle, for instance, is designed to be grabbed, so most people will grab 
the door handle in order to the open a door. In this example, the door handle influences 
behavior, so it can be considered an intentional form of  choice architecture. The second form of  
choice architecture manifests unintentionally and is the product of  uncontrollable factors, such as 
the weather. A study by Busse et al. found that weather has a significant impact on consumers 
who are purchasing vehicles. When the weather is warm and sunny consumers may fall victim to 
the projection bias, i.e. the tendency of  individuals “to over predict the degree to which their 
future tastes will resemble their current tastes” (Busse et al. 2012, 1), and purchase a car with a 
sunroof.  With consideration of  these ideas, the supporters of  libertarian paternalism argue the 
choice architecture is inevitable, rendering many forms of  paternalism unavoidable, so people 
might as well be nudged in a positive direction. 
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Chapter 3  
Criticisms of  Libertarian Paternalism   
	 In this chapter I outline the most common criticisms of  libertarian paternalism. In this 
effort, I hope to highlight the depth of  the debate surrounding the ethics of  libertarian 
paternalistic interventions. Furthermore, I explore how these criticisms apply to automatic 
enrollment and Save More Tomorrow. 
Libertarian Criticisms 
	 First and foremost, it is important to remember that libertarian paternalism is a form of  
paternalism. As such, libertarianism naturally opposes paternalism, so we will begin with the 
libertarian arguments against paternalism. Libertarianism has two primary oppositions to 
paternalism: the instrumental critique and the autonomy-violating critique.  
	 The instrumental objection to paternalism says that paternalism is ineffective. In other 
words, paternalistic policies — policies that we will consider as government interventions — have 
a tendency to bring about worse outcomes than if  individuals had the freedom to choose for 
themselves. Whether this failure is attributed to an ignorance of  preferences or the diverging 
agendas of  the state and its citizens, instrumental libertarians maintain that paternalism is  
consequentially ineffective. In a market context, for example, instrumental libertarians argue that 
“the common good is indirectly achieved through the actions of  well-informed, rational and… 
self-regarding economic agents” (Rebonato 2015, 92).  This consequentialist objection opposes 
any form of  paternalism and, by extension, libertarian paternalism. 
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	 The second libertarian objection emphasizes the dignity of  the autonomous choice. This 
is not a consequentialist argument. In this view, paternalism restrains an individual’s ability to 
choose autonomously, thereby diminishing their dignity as human beings. The autonomy-
autonomy-inspired libertarian may even concede that the outcome of  a paternalistic intervention 
may be better than if  the individual chose for themselves, but to them, the freedom of  choice is 
what is important. As an echo of  this sentiment, Mill writes that “it is possible that an individual 
might be guided in some good path, and kept out of  harm’s way,… but what will be his 
comparative worth as a human being”(Mill 1869, 55)? Therefore, for the autonomy-inspired 
libertarian, the value placed on autonomy is absolute.   
	 With consideration of  these two libertarian points of  view, any form of  paternalism is 
wrong, whether it judged by its means or ends. In regards to the autonomy-inspired objection, the 
question remains as to whether or not libertarian paternalistic policies like automatic enrollment  
allow individuals to retain their autonomy, as the program suggests it does. 
Is the Interpersonal Intelligibility of  Preferences Possible? 
	 One of  the most common lines of  criticism against libertarian paternalism takes issue 
with how policymakers can possibly understand peoples’ preferences. In order for a policy-maker 
to nudge someone in the direction that ‘she herself  would have chosen,’ the policymaker must be 
able to understand her preferences. Libertarian paternalists largely accomplish this goal by 
referring to what a rational actor would do. Therefore, libertarian paternalists refer to the Homo 
Economicus, who is “unencumbered by cognitive limitations” and tries to “maximize his own 
welfare” (Rebonato 2015, 154). Rebonato argues that utility maximization and self-interest are 
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not necessary, however, in the determination of  an individual’s preferences. He continues points 
out the importance of  revealed preferences in determining what an individual’s rational 
preferences may look like. Similarly, Binmore writes that “if  [an individual] acts consistently, she 
will act as though maximizing a utility function tailored to her own behavior” (Binmore 2009, 
20).  In this view, if  an individual is behaving consistently, they are acting rationally, and actions 
are representative of  rational preferences. Rebonato argues that libertarian paternalists fails 
because they must “guess [the] preferences by filtering out the ‘noise’ produced by the System-I 
self ” (Rebonato 2015, 152), which is arguably a difficult task. Even so, in the context of  
retirement savings, libertarian paternalists have undertaken this challenge with policies like 
automatically enrollment, where they assume that people’s true preference is to save more money. 
A Reluctance to Debias 
	 Rebonato asks the question,“are our cognitive limitations hard-wired” (Rebonato 2015, 
210)? One of  the central assumptions of  the libertarian paternalism program is that the biases 
and cognitive inadequacies of  an individual are treated as an “unchangeable biological 
given” (Rebonato 2015, 210). Also, as we have seen, libertarian paternalists argue that these 
aspects of  our decision-making ability lead us to make poor decisions. In order for the nudge 
agenda to maintain an ethical justification, it is, therefore, important to determine the extent to 
which these cognitive inadequacies are biologically hard-wired. In other words, libertarian 
paternalists, in Rebonato’s view, would need to explain why they prefer ‘nudging’ to ‘teaching,’ or 
another way of  way of  organizing choice settings so that it brings to fore the rational faculties of  
system-II (Rebonato 2015, 211).  Applying this arguments to retirement savings nudges, one 
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could argue that automatic enrollment and SMT treat procrastination and the status-quo bias to 
be biologically hard-wired biases,  making little effort to make people less susceptible to choice 
manipulation.  
	 Rebonato continues and argues hat Debiasing techniques could help people make better 
decisions, and even learn. Rebonato cites several papers that recommend how we can help 
people overcome theses cognitive biases. When dealing with contextualization and framing 
problems, he cites  Mitchell, who argues that we could encourage people to reframe choice 
problems into more personally meaningful frames, or encourage greater reflection and 
deliberation to help people overcome contextualization problems (Mitchell 2005, 9). 
	 Rebonato also argues that when considering statistical information, especially conditional 
probabilities, cognitive biases have a very strong impact. In a relevant study, Gigerenzer and 
Edwards report that doctors with an average of  14 years of  professional experience failed to 
determine the hypothetical probability that someone who tests positive for colorectal cancer 
actually has cancer. After being given the sensitivity and specificity of  the cancer test, the doctors’ 
estimates grossly overestimated the probability of  cancer, with most of  them providing answers of  
45% and higher (Gigerenzer & Edwards 2003, 741). The actually probability of  cancer in the 
hypothetical subject was about 5%. This result can largely be attributed to the base-rate neglect 
of  the doctors, who failed to consider how low the prevalence of  cancer really is. Using this example as 
evidence, Edwards and Gigerenzer argues that, yes, humans are vulnerable to cognitive biases, 
but this vulnerability is not strictly an internal cognitive weakness. He argues that “every piece of  
statistical information needs a representation… some forms tend to cloud minds, while others 
foster insight” (Rebonato 2015, 213).  In other words, Rebonato argues that when information is 
presented as misleading, it will be misleading, but if  it is presented in a way that helps people 
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overcome their cognitive biases, then it could help people learn, therefore “[fostering] 
insight” (Gigerenzer & Edwards 2003, 742). 
The Slippery Slope Argument  
	 One of  the most common lines of  criticism against libertarian paternalism, known as the 
slippery slope argument, says that if  libertarian paternalistic policies are allowed, it could lead to 
more and more paternalistic policies and an overly powerful government. Edward Glaeser in 
article entitled Paternalism and Psychology argues that:  
	 “Advocating soft paternalism is akin to advocating an increased role of  the incumbent 
government as an agent of  persuasion. Given how attractive it is to use persuasion for political 
advantage, an investment in soft paternalism seems to carry great risks…” (Glaeser 2005, 38) 
	 Here Glaeser implicitly raises the question of  how the governing party of  a democracy 
should be kept in check by its opposition and citizens. Often times, a defense against overly 
paternalistic interventions is “enhancing visibility and transparency,” which allows citizens to 
understand the “nature and reach of  the paternalistic intervention” (Rebonato 2015, 104). The 
trouble is that there is a fundamental difference between paternalistic interventions and those of  
the libertarian paternalist. Libertarian paternalistic policies are often implemented subtly and 
covertly, making them particularly dangerous. Glaeser and other opponents of  libertarian 
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paternalism would argue that these supposedly ‘soft’ paternalistic interventions could strengthen 
an overly-powerful government. 
	  
Excessive Faith in Policymakers and Social Planners  
	 The notion of  bounded rationality has been a main justification for libertarian 
paternalistic interventions. Edward Glaeser uses the same argument against libertarian 
paternalism, stating that “consumers have a better incentives to overcome errors than 
government decision-makers” (Glaeser 2005, 133). In other words, he argues that if  we accept 
that all human beings have a bounded rationality (i.e. display cognitive deficiencies), then 
politicians will also make decisional mistakes. Furthermore, he argues that humans have better 
incentives to overcome these decisional mistakes than government officials who are, too, bounded 
by their own rationality, as well as their preferences, goals and ideology. For these reasons, Glaeser 
argues that “recognizing the limits of  human cognition may strengthen the case for limited 
government (Glaeser 2005, 98). This criticism of  libertarian paternalism aligns closely with that 
of  the epistemic argument, which insists that “people should be allowed to act on the basis of  
their own judgments” because policymakers and social planners“lack the information that 
individuals have” (Sunstein 2015, 91).  
	 Having excessive faith in social planners is also dangerous because it may may negatively 
impact social learning. In the context of  defaults, for example, a decision-maker may be inclined 
to actively switch to a default because they consider the default option to be the expert opinion 
(Carlin et al. 2010). In some situations, defaults may be optimal, but in others, they may reduce 
social welfare. If  people do not invest in gathering new information themselves, then people may 
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rely on the opinion of  the social planner. The greater reliance on the social planner may reduce 
the “positive externalities from social learning” (Rebonato 2015, 123) and lead to unproductive 
homogeneity, especially if  the social planner ‘gets it wrong’.  
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not Soft Paternalism  
	 Bringing us to our last criticism, in The Manipulation of  Choice, Mark White argues that 
libertarian paternalism “is hard paternalism disguised as soft paternalism” (White 2013, 90). 
Libertarian paternalism purports to be soft paternalism, but it fails because it violates individual 
autonomy. As was previously outlined in chapter two, soft paternalism is the view that 
interventions are justified only under conditions when it is necessary to determine whether an 
individual or group is acting voluntarily and knowledgeably. Because it is impossible to know that 
person’s true interests, there is an assumption being made about what an individual truly prefers. 
Additionally, since nudges work by exploiting cognitive biases and heuristics, they work coercively 
and covertly, often without the person being nudged ever realizing they are being nudged. As a 
result, libertarian paternalists prevent the opportunity for poor decisions to be made, rendering 
libertarian paternalism hard paternalism. With consideration of  this objection, automatic 
enrollment may not be entirely unobjectionable. 
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Chapter 4   
The Libertarian Paternalistic Rebuttal 
	  
	 In this chapter several libertarian paternalistic rebuttals to the criticisms outlined in the 
previous chapter will be considered. This will, hopefully, capture the depth of  the debate 
surrounding the ethics of  nudging interventions and the extent to which libertarian paternalists 
have attempted to address some of  the most noteworthy objections.  
	  
Rebuttals to Libertarian Objections  
	 As we saw, libertarians argue that paternalism is ineffective and that, instrumentally, 
welfare is maximized without interventions. One could interpret this argument as a Hayekian 
challenge to paternalism. Hayek argued that the “dispersed nature of  human knowledge and the 
informational advantages of  markets” (Sunstein 2015, 93) are superior to that of  any social 
planner or policymaker. This competition of  knowledge, in effect, promotes welfare that any 
paternalistic intervention would hold back. The libertarian paternalist response to this argument 
says that “good choice architecture… should promote rather than squelch competition” (Sunstein 
2015, 113). Sunstein continues and argues that we should keep “Hayekian objections in mind” as 
long as “choice architects provide information about warnings and risks” (Sunstein 2015,  113). 
Keeping this in mind, libertarian paternalists acknowledge the importance of  competition and 
unregulated informational exchange, but emphasize the importance of  ‘good’ choice architecture 
in stimulating competition and not restraining it. Richard Thaler in Nudge mentions that some 
critics “object to any forced exchanges” and that they don’t like “any government policy that 
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takes resources from some in order to assist other” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 248). In this view, 
paternalistic interventions do may require them to pay for a program that doesn’t benefit them, 
but instead someone in need. Paradoxically, this may only hinder competition. If  people who 
need help are also imposing a cost on society — for example, through higher health costs — than 
helping them out a little bit might help them be more productive and competitive.  
	 The other  libertarian objection to paternalism argues that autonomy should be 
preserved. In this view, any paternalistic intervention limits an individual’s freedom to choose. 
Libertarian paternalists, however, argue that their interventions are freedom preserving and allow 
individuals to retain their autonomy because they are easily reversible. By making an intervention 
easily avoidable, the “low-cost opt out rights” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 236) are designed to 
help retain freedom of  choice. Even so, I would argue this poses a difficult challenge. While many 
interventions may be nominally reversible, nudges are not altogether avoidable, especially if  they 
on the exploitation of  heuristics and biases. 
Expressed Preferences  
	 Plainly, some critics of  libertarian paternalism argue that the only way to determine an 
individual’s preferences is to look at their revealed preferences. The libertarian paternalist would 
argue that revealed preferences may not be representative of  an individual’s true preferences. So, 
they look at an individual’s expressed preferences, i.e. what people say that want to do, but cannot 
do. Libertarian paternalists argue that cognitive biases and heuristics explain why people cannot 
realize these expressed preferences. For example, inertia and procrastination are thought to 
prevent people from joining retirement plans.  
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	 Generally, behavioral economists take issue with revealed preference theory as a method 
of  determining what constitutes an individual’s preferences and, by extension, a rational decision. 
In fact, this  very disagreement contributed to the development of  behavioral economics in the 
20th century. In 1938, Paul Samuelson attempted to re-construct consumer choice theory 
without reference to preferences or utility. He wanted to “develop a theory of  consumer’s 
behavior freed from any vestigial traces of  the utility concept”(Hédoin 2014, 1). He defined a 
consistency condition which is now known as the weak axiom of  revealed preference (WARP). 
WARP says that if  a bundle of  goods A is chosen over bundle B when both are affordable, then 
the consumer shows (reveals) that they prefer A over B. From this logic, WARP says that if  these 
are the consumer’s true preferences, then under no circumstances would the consumer prefer 
bundle B to bundle A. Sen disagreed with these basic axioms.  
	 In the 1970’s Sen began his criticism of  Samuelson’s revealed preference hypothesis, 
claiming that “man is a social animal” and his choices are “not rigidly bound to his own 
preferences only”(Sen 1973, 253). Sen argued that, every time an individual makes a decision, it 
is context-dependent. This means that the axioms of  Revealed preference theory are 
“conceptually meaningless” (Hédoin 2014, 8) unless preferences are understood as mental states 
referring to an evaluation of  personal welfare at a particular point in time. Also, Sen points out 
that consumers’ preferences are often menu dependent. This means that the preference ordering 
of  a person changes depending the set of  available alternatives. In this effort, Sen effectively 
demonstrated that consumer preferences are not consistent. If, then, preferences are not stable 
and consistent, libertarian paternalists would likely argue that the task of  interpersonal 
intelligibility is necessary if  a nudge is to promote their welfare. 
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Is the Mistake Worth the Cost? 
	 Rebonato proposed that most libertarian paternalistic policies are one-shot methods of  
preventing mistakes and do not help people learn. Since people learn by making mistakes, they 
should be allowed to make irrational decisions as a part of  a learning process. Thaler and 
Sunstein argue that they are not preventing people from making mistakes. Instead, they argue 
that if  people “really want to invest their entire retirement portfolio in high-tech Romanian 
stocks” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 240), they should certainly be allowed, but there is also little 
harm in putting “warning signs up along the way” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 240). In their view, 
learning is important, but there are some situations when the cost of  making the mistake it so 
high, that a nudge may help prevent someone from making a terrible decisions. For example, it 
may not be wise to let a child fall into the pool in hopes that he will emerge a great swimmer. In 
the effort of  aiding in the learning process, libertarian paternalists claim that they are not trying 
to infantilize people. If  interventions provide truthful information or helpful warnings, “it is not 
impeding learning” (Sunstein 2015,  114). Forms of  hard paternalism, on the other hand, may 
impede learning because they might prohibit decision-makers from making the bad decision even 
if  they are aware of  the consequences.  
Rebuttal to the Slippery Slope Argument 
	 The slippery slope argument says that if  some paternalistic interventions are allowed, 
then more will follow, until there is “an onslaught of  intrusive forms of  paternalism” (Sunstein & 
Thaler 2009, 235). Libertarian paternalists have three responses to this line of  criticism. First, 
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they argue that supporters of  the slippery slop argument are “[ducking] the question of  whether 
[libertarian paternalistic] proposals have merit in and of  themselves” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 
235). Sunstein and Thaler believe that their proposals really do make people better off, whether it 
is by helping them save more, eat better, or choose better insurance plans. In short, libertarian 
paternalists believe that the slippery slope argument fails to criticize the proposals directly. 
	 Second, libertarian paternalists argue that their proposals are “emphatically designed to 
retain freedom of  choice” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 236). By maintaining the belief  that 
proposals should be easily reversible, they argue that low-cost opt-out rights “reduce the steepness 
of  the slippery slope” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 236). This line of  defense is similar to their third 
rebuttal to the slippery-slope argument, which says that “it is pointless to ask the government to 
just stand aside” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 236). If  choice architecture is inevitable, it would be 
unwise to let it impact people negatively, when it could be altered to someone’s advantage. In 
many ways, the onslaught of  interventions has already begun, but it may just be hard to 
recognize. They argue that these interventions already exist, but they “so obvious and so sensible 
that that they do not see them as rules at all” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 237). 
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Chapter 5   
The Ethics of  Nudging in Retirement Savings  
	  
	 Having discussed the criticisms and defenses of  libertarian paternalism at length,  I would 
now like to discuss the ethics of  libertarian paternalism policies in retirement savings. In this 
effort, I aim to contextualize the arguments that have been explored so far, and explore the extent 
to which nudges are ethical in the context of  retirement savings. In the context of  the ethical 
debate, I explore the ethical implications of  automatic enrollment and the Save More Tomorrow  
plan. In doing so, I ask whether or not these interventions can successfully understand individual 
preferences, respect autonomy, and promote welfare in the long run. 
The Ethics of  Automatic Enrollment 
	 First, it becomes necessary to determine the extent to which libertarian paternalists can 
successfully determine people’s retirement savings preferences. Using revealed preferences as a 
method of  doing so, it would seem as if  people are already acting rationally, since people around 
the world are consistently revealing their preference to not save. This behavior could be further 
rationalized by arguing that people are choosing to actively consume today because any shift of  
expenditure into the future would not necessarily make them better off. The consumption 
expenditure of  budget constrained households (and young households, especially) may have high 
marginal values (Zywicki 2017, 919). If  this is true, then it may not be in a household’s interest to 
shift expenditure into the future when they need it for consumption today. This argument not 
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only resonates with the revealed preference notion of  rationality, but with that of  the epistemic 
argument which says that households and individuals understand their preferences better than 
policymakers, and are thus better equipped to promote their own welfare in the context of  
retirement savings. 
	 However, as was already mentioned, some people may not be saving as much as they 
want to. In this view, libertarian paternalists are looking at the expressed preferences of  
individuals rather than their revealed preferences. Automatic enrollment, therefore, is thought to 
help people realize their expressed preferences and overcome the negative consequences of  
procrastination, a bias to the status quo, and/or a lack of  willpower. I would argue that, for the 
people who have expressed an interest in wanting to save more, automatic enrollment is a good 
method of  helping them save more for retirement. As anyone who has a lived a day on this planet 
knows, procrastination and a lack of  willpower often prevent optimal decisions from being made. 
Still, how can a policymaker identify who wants to save more but can’t, exactly?  
   	 Automatic enrollment is promoted as an asymmetrical form of  paternalism, meaning it is 
designed to help the least sophisticated members of  society, while imposing few costs on the most 
sophisticated (Benartzi & Thaler 2004). This argument would mean that those who are saving 
hardly any money would be the least sophisticated, and are thus deemed the people who should 
be nudged into saving more, and whose informed preferences would be to save more. But, as was 
already mentioned, it may be the case that these “unsophisticated” households are budget 
constrained and, therefore, would only be impacted negatively by shifting consumption into the 
future. So, in this way, automatically enrolling people would asymmetrically affect some 
households negatively.  
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	 Overall, it seems as if  automatic enrollment takes individual preferences in retirement 
savings to be expressed preferences, or the preferences that would make an individual better off, 
‘as judged by themselves’. Still, the trouble is that, without asking every single person whether or 
not they want to save more money, the task of  determining an individual’s preferences is very 
difficult, if  not impossible. In consideration of  automatic enrollment as a method of  addressing 
low enrollment rates, I would argue that, while it may help some people overcome a lack of  will 
power and procrastination, it makes unfair assumptions about people’s preferences — preferences 
that cannot be understood by a planner or policymaker. Instead, automatic enrollment makes 
value substituting assumptions about people’s preferences (White 2013). For these reasons, I 
believe there are better alternatives to automatic enrollment that do a better job at understanding 
people’s preferences. 
	 Next, Libertarian paternalism claims to be a form of  soft paternalism. However, upon 
closer inspection, I would argue that this claim is disputable depending on the context. In this 
case of  automatic enrollment, I argue that it is not soft paternalism. Let us revisit Mill’s example 
of  the uninformed man who is about to cross a damaged bridge. In this example, the man who is 
about to cross the bridge lacks valuable information — information that could save his life. Thus, 
he could benefit from a paternalistic intervention. A soft paternalistic intervention would involve 
stopping the man because it is necessary to make sure that he is aware of  the dangers that lie 
ahead of  him. If, in light of  receiving this information, he still wants to continue, then the soft 
paternalist should allow him to exercise his autonomy and continue, even if  this means certain danger 
and possible death await him. On the other hand, a hard paternalist would prohibit the man from 
crossing even he were aware of  the risks. In this case, the hard paternalist would be substituting 
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their own values for that of  the man who wants to take risks, consequently preventing him from 
exercising his individual autonomy.  In this hard paternalistic view, an assumption is being made 
that the man’s true preference is to not cross the bridge. Even if  he voluntarily wants to, say, 
commit suicide, the hard paternalist is assuming that this is not what he really wants.  
	 With consideration of  the bridge metaphor, I would argue that automatic enrollment is 
not soft paternalism. Soft paternalism argues that interventions are justified only under conditions 
when it is necessary to determine if  an individual or group is acting voluntarily and 
knowledgeably. In the context of  automatic enrollment, I would not say that it is necessary to 
determine whether or not an individual is voluntarily choosing to not participate in a retirement 
plan.  By automatically enrolling an individual into a retirement plan, the policymaker is 
implicitly claiming that it is not possible to determine whether or not the person is acting 
voluntarily or knowledgeably. Moreover, since sure-danger lies ahead of  this person, an 
intervention is justified. In this case, libertarian paternalists take low-participation rates and 
expressed preferences alone to mean that individuals must be mistaken or confused, and are thus 
unsure of  whether or not they want to join a retirement plan. That being so, I would argue that  
automatic enrollment is hard paternalism because it may not be necessary to determine whether 
or not an  individual is acting or voluntarily or not.  
	 Secondly, under automatic enrollment, it is impossible to determine whether or not an 
individual is voluntarily choosing not to participate in a retirement plan. Even if  it were necessary to 
determine whether or not an individual is voluntarily not participating in a plan, how could an 
opt-out nudge determine if  an individual is acting voluntarily? Going back to Mill’s bridge 
example, a soft paternalist must let the man cross the bridge if  he is aware of  its dangers and still 
wants to continue. In this case, it may be deemed unwise to cross the bridge, but the man is 
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entitled to exercise his autonomy. However, automatic enrollment — by design — is incapable of  
determining whether or not an individual is acting voluntarily. Plainly, it prevents people from 
making a decision. 
	 In response to this argument, a libertarian paternalist may argue that, since the 
intervention is easily reversible, an individual ’s freedom is not being violated. At any point, the 
person who is automatically enrolled could ostensibly opt-out of  the plan. However, I would 
argue that, since automatic enrollment functions by taking exploiting cognitive heuristics, and 
biases, it are sneaky and covert.  In this way, individual autonomy is violated. Referring back to 
Gerald Dworkin’s view of  autonomy, it is  “the capacity of  a person to critically reflect upon, and 
then attempt to accept or change, his or her preferences, desires, values, and ideals” (Dworkin, 
1988, p. 48). Using this definition of  autonomy, we see that people are not being given the 
opportunity to accept or change their preferences because they are covertly steered into joining 
the plan via an exploitation of  cognitive heuristics and biases. Often times, people may be 
unaware that they have been nudged into a retirement savings plan and are thereby robbed of  an 
opportunity to critically reflect on their decision. As a result, they are coercively manipulated into 
doing something they may or may not want to do. Furthermore, once they are defaulted into the 
retirement savings plan, the status quo bias, that was previously preventing them from joining, is 
now working to keep them in.  
	 Overall, I would argue that automatic enrollment is a poor example of  soft paternalism 
because 1) there is not sufficient justification to determine whether or not people are acting 
voluntarily by not joining, 2) by defaulting people into a plan there is no way to determine 
whether or not they don’t want to be defaulted, and 3) their autonomy is violated because it 
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exploits people’s bias to the status quo. In consideration of  these factors, I would say that it is 
merely paternalism with a mask.  It isn’t a nudge, it’s a shove. 
	 Finally, Libertarians would argue that people learn by making mistakes, so they should be 
allowed to make irrational decisions as a method of  learning. Thaler and Sunstein respond to this 
common objection by arguing that there are some situations where the costs of  making a mistake 
are so high that a nudge may help prevent a terrible decision. Since I find insufficient reason to 
believe that everyone needs to be nudged into saving more for retirement, it is not obvious that 
forgoing participant in a 401(k) plan is a ‘terrible decision.’ As I’ve mentioned, there are plenty of  
reasons why an employee may not want to join a retirement savings plan — reasons that a 
policymaker cannot understand. Moreover, Cass Sunstein writes himself  that “with respect to 
learning, some forms of  hard paternalism might run into strong objections” (Sunstein 2015, 114). 
As I have argued, I believe that automatic enrollment is not a form of  soft paternalism so I agree 
with him entirely. Under automatic enrollment people are nudged away from making a mistake. 
Since people are covertly manipulated in a certain direction, it effectively prevents them from 
having the option of  choosing what they want to choose, even if  that decision would be a 
suboptimal decision. By defaulting people into a retirement savings plan, people are infantilized 
and denied of  their right to make the decision that a policymaker has deemed irrational. In this 
view, automatic enrollment prevents people from having the opportunity to learn because the 
opportunity is blocked from the start.  
	 Let us know pretend that not participating in a retirement savings plan is a terrible 
decision. Even if  automatic enrollment were to increase an individual’s well-being, there is reason 
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to believe that it could affect an individual’s future preferences.  Even though I have stressed the 
futility of  determining an individual’s true preferences, I would not argue that people’s 
preferences are stable and consistent like revealed preference theory suggests. That being so, it 
important to understand how actions not only reveal preferences, but create them (Norton & 
Ariely, 2008). A nudge at time t is likely to influence an individual’s preferences at time t +1 and 
onward (Binder 2014). Accordingly, automatic enrollment could have inter-temporal affects on 
people’s preferences.  
	 First, people who are automatically enrolled  would lose the opportunity to learn about 
their preferences through cognitive reflection, thereby affecting what their future preferences 
could have been. Second, since individuals most often learn unknowingly through associative 
learning (Witt 2001), automatic enrollment could stealthily impact preference learning. 
Preferences learned via associative learning tend to be difficult to unlearn because of  the low 
conscious involvement and repeated reinforcement over time (Zajonc and Markus, 1982). That 
being so, automatic enrollment may create preferences for sticking with defaults and putting faith 
in the ‘expert’ opinion policymakers. This could lead to a dangerous situation where individual 
preferences become deeply entrenched and no longer subject to doubt. Also, as was discussed in 
chapter 3, this may lead to homogeneity and excessive faith in the policymaker that would 
negatively impact social learning and the positive externalities that come from it (Carlin et. al. 
2010).  
	 Also, on the topic of  learning, I would argue that automatic enrollment is a great example 
of  how many libertarian paternalistic interventions demonstrate a reluctance to de-bias decision 
making. By defaulting people into a retirement plan, policymakers are taking procrastination, 
hyperbolic discounting, a lack of  willpower, and a bias to the status quo to be intrinsic and hard-
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wired aspects of  human cognition. In this view, not only could automatic enrollment affect 
preference learning, but it would not help people overcome their biases, effectively shaping new 
preferences and strengthening the impact of  cognitive biases. Individuals could end up learning 
to be dependent and inactive, resulting in a reduction of  their autonomy and active of  use of  
critical system II decision making.  
	 Aside from learning, I would argue that by increasing participating rates in retirement 
savings plans, there could be several positive impacts. First, it would put less strain on social 
security — a program that is arguably inadequate as a primary means of  provisioning for the 
future. Hypothetically, if  someone were to fail to save for retirement because inertia and 
procrastination, they may end up economically disadvantaged. Moreover, it may also place a 
financial burden on that person’s family, who now must forgo consumption, saving, or investment 
in order to take care of  them, in turn affecting their ability to save for retirement. Keeping this in 
mind, it is definitely a good idea to encourage people to save, but automatic enrollment may not 
be the most ethical way to do it.  
The Ethics of  Save More Tomorrow™ 
	 In many ways, I would argue that Save Tore Tomorrow is much less manipulative than 
automatic enrollment. Under the SMT plan, employees are nudged into saving at a preset default 
contribution rate and asset allocation. Furthermore, employees’ savings rates are escalated 
automatically to account for hyperbolic discounting. Since these contribution increases are 
synchronized with pay raises, people do not experience the negative effects of  loss-aversion. 
Lastly, the same inertia that prevents people from joining the program is now leveraged toward 
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keeping them in the program. All of  these features make up the SMT plan, making it markedly 
different than automatic enrollment, whose mechanism is more simple and, as we have seen, 
more coercive.  
	 In regards to the intelligibility of  people’s preferences, the Save More Tomorrow plan is 
notably different than automatic enrollment. As a part of  the SMT plan, “employees are 
approached” (Thaler & Benartzi 2004, 170) by a financial consultant and asked whether or not 
they want to join the plan. In this way, since employees are directly asked about their preferences, 
the task of  determining their preferences becomes possible. The financial consultant tells the 
employee about the program and, through this process, full information is given to the employee. 
This means that when employees do make a decision on whether or not to join the SMT 
program, they are actively making a decision, thus revealing their preference to join or not join. 
They are asked to commit in advance to account for the negative effects of  hyperbolic 
discounting, helping people overcome a strong time preference for current consumption. One 
could argue that this time preference is rational since employees have revealed their preferences 
by not joining. However, I would argue that procrastination is a powerful force, so by requiring 
people to make a decision, they can express their true preferences.  
	 Unlike automatic enrollment, SMT is a clear example of  soft paternalism. Employers 
intervene at an early stage and determine whether or not employees wants to join the plan. In 
doing so, the employer would be able to determine whether or the employee wants to voluntarily 
make a suboptimal decision, which they are entitled to. Referring to Dworkin’s view of  
autonomy, we see that employees have the opportunity to “attempt to accept or change their 
preferences” (Dworkin 1988, 48) at this stage. As such, employers are not using deception or 
coercion to influence behavior. Rather, they are encouraging critical reflection, allowing people to 
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engage their system II and make an autonomous decision. Applying Mill’s bridge example to 
SMT, we see that employees are intercepted preemptively and warned of  the dangers of  the 
bridge — that is, the danger of  not saving for retirement. Thus, individual autonomy is not 
violated.  
	 In regards to promoting welfare over time, I would argue that, since the Save More 
Tomorrow program gives employees the opportunity to decide, they could learn via cognitive 
reflection about their decision. However, just like with automatic enrollment, those who do 
choose to participate in the program would be subject to associative learning, where their 
preference for the default would be reinforced over time. This would have the same effect on 
inter temporal preferences as automatic enrollment, functioning also as a one-shot intervention 
not aimed at helping people make a critical decision and overcome cognitive biases. By enrolling 
an employee into the program, they may passively develop a preference and dependence on the 
default. In effect, this would lead to an “inert acceptance of  a default option” in which the brains 
of  decision makers will “become ill-equipped to reason rationally and critically about the next 
choice” (Rebonato 2015, 219). Since SMT succeeds by exploiting how people fail to distinguish 
between nominal and real income, it is merely changing “the optics of  the scheme” by making 
sure that employees never see a decrease in their income in nominal terms, even though “the 
purchasing power of  the take home pay check decreases year after year” (Rebonato 2015, 161). 
People often fail to understand the effects of  inflation, which is a deeply ingrained bias (Shiller 
2008). As such, SMT fails to help people overcome this bias. There may be ways, however, to 
help people overcome these biases and learn to make better decisions over time that still 
incorporate the automatic escalation of  pay raises.   
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	 Overall, SMT is a more ethical approach to promoting retirement savings because it is 
more successful in determining preferences and promoting autonomy. Even so, it may still lead 
people to develop a dependence on defaults. Lastly, if  SMT is combined with automatic 
enrollment, as it is often found, then I would argue the merits of  the intervention are 
compromised. In this way, the plan would not only be coercive and deceptive, but it could 
exacerbate dependence on default plans, thereby reducing future decisional autonomy even more 
than automatic enrollment does on its own.  
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Chapter 6  
Ethical Interventions in Retirement Savings  
	 In this chapter, I aim to provide a conclusive recommendation on how employees could 
be ethically helped to save more for retirement. In this effort, I first emphasize the importance of  
knowing people’s preferences and not making value substituting assumptions. Second, I 
emphasize the importance of  making sure that individual autonomy is not violated, i.e. ensuring 
that people have the opportunity to accept or change their preferences and make a reflective 
system-II decision. Lastly, I emphasize the importance of  promoting individual welfare over time 
by helping people learn, not make ‘inert’ decisions, and overcome cognitive biases. Overall, I 
argue that there are ways to ethically help people to save more for retirement, where their 
autonomy is not violated, but rather, enhanced. 
	 To start, we must return to the central question of  how a policymaker can determine an 
individual’s preferences. Making sure that an intervention does not make value-substituting 
assumptions about individual preferences is key. Thaler and sunstein argue that automatic 
enrollment and Save More Tomorrow are aimed to help people whose expressed preferences are 
to save more, even though their revealed preferences say otherwise. In order to help these people, 
I would argue that there are better ways that using opt-out default nudges.  
	 Naturally, the first way to address the issue of  determining individual preferences would 
be to require employees to make a decision. This method is known as required active choosing 
and it requires new employees to choose whether or not they want to be in the plan. If  they 
choose to be in a plan, they would also be required to choose a contribution rate. This method is 
useful because it gives employees the freedom to choose the plan that they prefer. Also, required 
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active choosing “encourages agents to think about an important decision and thereby avoid 
procrastinating” (Carroll et. al. 2005, pg. 3). Therefore, required active choosing may be effective 
in helping people overcome decisional inertia preventing them from realizing their expressed 
preferences. It has also been found to be more effective than standard opt-in approaches. For 
instance, one company that switched from the standard opt-in approach to required active 
choosing saw a 25 percent increase in participation rates (Carroll et. al. 2005). On the surface, 
this may seem like an ideal solution, but as Cass Sunstein would argue, required active choosing 
is a still form of  paternalism because some people may choose not to choose (Sunstein 2014). For 
one reason or another, some people may prefer to not make a decision. Some people might fear 
that they will make a bad decision. Others may be aware of  their lack of  information or fear the 
complexity of  the task. Some people might even hate the task of  choosing. For these reasons, 
requiring people to choose is still a form of  paternalism that could distort individual preferences.  
	 As an alternative to required active choosing and automatic enrollment, I would argue 
that the best way to help people whose expressed preferences are to save more is to make the 
enrollment process easier. This can be done by reducing the complexity of  the decision process 
and by giving people an opportunity to easily join the plan they want to join. In a 2006 study, 
researchers looked at the effectiveness of  a low-cost manipulation designed to simplify the 
enrollment process called Quick Enrollment™. Under this approach, employees are given the  
option of  opting-in to a default contribution rate and asset allocation. This design reduces 
complexity and helps employees evaluate a smaller subset of  options (Choi et. at. 2006). Using 
this method, people can easily realize their expressed preferences and overcome procrastination 
and inertia. At one company, this method tripled participation rates among new employees 
within three months of  being hired (Choi et. at. 2006). This finding shows that Quick 
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Enrollment™ is an effective method of  helping people save, and it does not make value 
substituting assumptions about employees’ preferences.  
	 Under Quick Enrollment™, however, employees are enrolled at a preselected 
contribution rate and asset allocation. In this way, some decisions are still being made for the 
employee. Perhaps a good way to address this problem would be to give employees — while still 
keeping the enrollment process simple — a few options with variable contribution rates. Even 
more, employees could be assisted by a financial advisor who could help them pick the plan that 
best fits their expressed preferences.  
	 In regards to asset allocation, this turns out to be a much more complex task, so I would 
argue that it not a bad idea for employees to stick with the default. Benartzi and Thaler 
investigated whether participants are good at picking a portfolio, as judged by themselves 
(Benartzi and Thaler 2002). In this study, subjects were presented with three unlabeled 
distributions of  projected retirement income and asked to rate them on a scale of  one to five, 
with five being the most attractive. The authors found that self-constructed portfolios received the 
lowest average rating, while professionally managed portfolios received the highest. To add, 
among the people who expressed a preference to pick their own portfolios, 80 percent of  them 
found the professionally managed accounts more attractive (Benartzi & Thaler 2002). This 
finding highlights the difficultly of  constructing portfolios and that people would likely be better 
off  having someone else make the decision for them. Still, some employees may still insist that 
they want to construct their own portfolio. For these individuals, it may be useful to offer 
“lifestyle” funds that “blend stocks and bonds in a way designed to meet the needs of  different 
levels of  risk tolerance” (Benartzi & Thaler 2004, 88). For instance, employees could choose from 
a conservative, moderate, or aggressive portfolio.  
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	 With consideration of  these approaches, I maintain the assertion that an ethical method 
of  determining people’s preferences would be to allow them to choose for themselves, while 
emphasizing simplicity of  the enrollment process. If  people are truly so strongly impacted by a 
lack of  willpower, procrastination, hyperbolic discounting, etc. then making the enrollment 
process easier would certainly help them overcome these hindrances. In doing so, value 
substituting assumptions would not be made and policymakers could reasonably determine 
employee preferences. In practice, this could promote individual welfare and even enhance 
individual autonomy. 
	  
	 Next, I argue that interventions should not violate individual autonomy. Even more, 
theyshould not only aim to not violate autonomy, but encourage it. In Dworkin’s view, if  
autonomy is to be preserved, individuals should be given the opportunity to accept or change 
their preferences. Therefore, in the context of  retirement savings interventions, efforts should be 
made to encourage critical cognitive reflection, thereby giving people an opportunity to accept or 
change their preference. One of  the best ways to do this would be to increase transparency, 
thereby preventing deception or coercion. Another way to encourage individual autonomy would 
be to enact policies that encourage system II decision making and reduce the negative effects of  
cognitive biases and heuristics.  
	 Under  automatic enrollment, decision-makers are subtly manipulated into joining 
retirement savings plans through the exploitation of  heuristics and cognitive biases — a process 
that largely lacks transparency. Rather, it coercively manipulates individuals into joining plans 
they may not want to join because, by design, automatic enrollment is covert and relies on the 
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“yeah, whatever heuristic” (Sunstein & Thaler 2009, 35) to increase 401 (k) participating rates. 
Keeping this in mind, increasing transparency could encourage individual autonomy.  
	 There are several ways policymakers could increase transparency. First, policymakers 
could use a method like Quick Enrollment™, where employees are not tricked into enrolling. 
Next, policymakers could increase transparency of  goals. In the context of  retirement savings, 
policymakers could inform employees that savings rates are typically quite low and it may be in 
their interest to join.  Lastly, policymakers could increase transparency of  means. This could 
entail informing employees of  the enrollment method that is being used. If  a Quick 
Enrollment™ policy were being used, for instance, employers could inform employees of  how the 
system works and that, if  they do join, they will be enrolled at a default contribution rate and 
asset allocation.  
	 Another way to increase decisional autonomy in 401(k) enrollment is to use de-biasing 
techniques. These techniques could reduce the negative impact of  cognitive errors on decision 
making, thereby increasing autonomy. One of  the best ways to do this is to simplify the 
enrollment process. By presenting information in a simple and easy to understand format, people 
can more effectively call upon the rational faculties of  system-II. In many situations, “information 
needs a representation — that is, a form” (Gigerenzer & Edwards 2003, 741) that is not 
misleading, but rather, easy to understand. By reducing the complexity of  a problem, people may 
have more success in exercising their autonomy. Another method of  promoting autonomy is to 
reduce the choice set to a manageable size such that a decision-maker’s ability to autonomously 
make a decision is not compromised. Since autonomy is not merely the nominal freedom to 
choose, it may not be the case that providing every choice option would increase autonomy. In 
fact, “freedom of  this sort is ironically constraining” (Trout 2005,  416), as it is likely to 
 
!46
overwhelm decision makers and make it harder for them to authentically accept or change their 
preferences. In a relevant study, Sheena Iyengar explored the effects of  limited choice on 401(k) 
enrollment rates and found that the more retirement plan options employees are offered, the 
lower the participation rates (Lyengar et al. 2004). Keeping this in mind, I would argue that by 
reducing the choice set and making the enrollment process easier, autonomy can be enhanced. 
	 Meanwhile, another method of  promoting autonomy in retirement savings would be 
enact policies that foster system-II decision making. Policymakers could implement policies such 
as required active choosing that call to the fore the rational faculties of  system-II. However, as I 
previously mentioned, since required active choosing is still paternalistic, it is important that 
simplification of  the enrollment process is maintained. I would argue that something like Quick 
Enrollment™ could be implemented, but instead of  opting-in to a default, employees could pick 
from a few simplified options, thereby retaining their freedom to choose while simultaneously 
encouraging critical, system-II thinking.  
	 Along the same lines of  promoting decisional autonomy, is the importance of  helping 
people make better decisions in the long-run, thus creating opportunities for people to promote 
their own welfare in the future. In this view, interventions aimed at increasing retirement savings 
should not be one-shot interventions aimed at helping an employee at time t, but also at time t +1 
and onwards. As it turns out, one of  the best ways to promote welfare in the long run would be to 
employ similar methods used to promote individual autonomy at time t, as we have covered. 
These methods are largely aimed to help people reduce the effects of  their cognitive errors as 
well as promote the activation of  system-II faculties, therefore preventing an inert dependence on 
defaults and the expert opinion of  policymakers.  
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	 One method of  helping people make decisions over-time would be to give them the 
opportunity to change their retirement savings plan without penalty in the future. These are 
known as “cooling off ” periods, and would give employees not only the opportunity to consider 
the salient features of  a retirement plan at time t, but “also those that will more import when the 
outcomes are experienced” (Johnson et al. 2012,  498). As a policy recommendation, perhaps 
employees could be approached a few months after a retirement savings decision has been made 
and asked about whether or not they want to stick with it, drop the plan, or change it. In this way, 
employees would not develop a bias to the status quo that may develop during the cooling off  
period. This process, in its entirety, could encourage thoughtfulness and active cognitive reflection 
their retirement savings plan, therefore fostering insight and helping employees learn. 
	 Finally, another way of  helping promote welfare in the long run could be to directly teach 
employees about cognitive biases that have the potential to affect decisions at time t and beyond. 
For instance, even if  employees were enrolled into a plan through something like Quick 
Enrollment™ or automatic enrollment, they could be taught about the effects cognitive biases, 
such as the exponential growth bias. Exponential-growth bias is a perceptual bias that manifests 
from an underestimation of  how value grows exponentially with compounding interest. In a 
relevant study, researchers argued that a misunderstanding of  these biases, particularly the 
exponential-growth bias, significantly contributes to low retirement savings (Goda et. al. 2015). If  
people could be reminded of  the compounding effects of  exponential growth, the effects of  the 
biases could be mitigated, thereby increasing the likelihood of  increased retirement plan 
participation rates. 
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Conclusion  
	 To summarize what has been discussed thus far, I would begin by saying that nudging is 
not without its merits. That being said, it is important to remember when it is useful and when it 
is not. In the context of  retirement savings, as we have seen, there is undoubtedly room for 
people to make better decisions — decisions that could have a lasting impact on their well-being. 
In this effort of  helping people make better decisions, I maintain that it should be done ethically.  
	 As I have emphasized over the course of  this paper, it is essential  that policymakers be 
successful in determining people’s preferences. In retirement savings interventions, libertarian 
paternalistic policies have taken the expressed preferences of  some people to represent the true 
preferences of  most. Surely, this view is not without justification, as humans are undoubtedly 
guilty of  fallibility. In this fallibility, people become victims of  biases and blunders, neglecting the 
vital task of  provisioning for the future. Even so, I maintain the assertion that, in policymaking, 
value substituting assumptions of  individuals’ preferences should be avoided at all costs. If  and 
when possible, a decision-maker should be asked to think of  her preferences, for she is most 
keenly aware of  what is important and necessary in her life.  
	 Furthermore, it remains imperative to respect the dignity of  individuals whose right to 
autonomy is absolute. In regards to retirement savings plans, people should be given the chance 
to make a thoughtful decision. In this effort, they should not be coerced or deceived through an 
exploitation of  biases that already stand to threaten autonomy. If  anything has become clear as a 
result of  this investigation, it is the fragility of  individual autonomy. The act of  making an 
autonomous decision is a challenging endeavor, since one must reflect upon their “preferences, 
desires, values, and ideals” (Dworkin 1988, 48), and then attempt to accept or change them. That 
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being so, decision makers should never be denied the opportunity to exercise their autonomy, as it 
not an easy task. Instead, decision-makers should be urged to reflect on their preferences, desires, 
values and ideals. In this effort, people are gifted the opportunity to learn. After all, we all have 
the right to be foolish” (Ludwig von Mises, 1979).  
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Appendix 
Figure 1  
(Source: Sunstein, Cass R., and Richard H. Thaler. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth 
and Happiness. Penguin, 2012.)
 
